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Abstract: Industry 4.0 and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) are paradigms that are driving
current industrial revolution by connecting to the Internet industrial machinery, management tools
or products so as to control and gather data about them. The problem is that many IIoT/Industry
4.0 devices have been connected to the Internet without considering the implementation of proper
security measures, thus existing many examples of misconfigured or weakly protected devices.
Securing such systems requires very specific skills, which, unfortunately, are not taught extensively
in engineering schools. This article details how Industry 4.0 and IIoT cybersecurity can be learned
through practical use cases, making use of a methodology that allows for carrying out audits to
students that have no previous experience in IIoT or industrial cybersecurity. The described teaching
approach is blended and has been imparted at the University of A Coruña (Spain) during the last
years, even during the first semester of 2020, when the university was closed due to the COVID-19
pandemic lockdown. Such an approach is supported by online tools like Shodan, which ease the
detection of vulnerable IIoT devices. The feedback results provided by the students show that they
consider useful the proposed methodology, which allowed them to find that 13% of the IIoT/Industry
4.0 systems they analyzed could be accessed really easily. In addition, the obtained teaching results
indicate that the established course learning outcomes are accomplished. Therefore, this article
provides useful guidelines for teaching industrial cybersecurity and thus train the next generation of
security researchers and developers.
Keywords: IIoT; Industry 4.0; cybersecurity; Shodan; blended teaching; use-case based teaching; use
case based learning; security audit
1. Introduction
Industry 4.0 is a concept that sets the foundations for evolving traditional factories to become
smarter. Such an evolution is aimed at optimizing process efficiency and flexibility through
the application of the latest technologies [1,2]. Industry 4.0 foundations are similar to the
ones suggested by other paradigms and initiatives, like Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) [3],
Internet Plus [4] or Made in China 2025 [5]. The most relevant technologies involved in Industry
4.0 are depicted in Figure 1 and include, among others, Augmented/Mixed/Virtual Reality
(AR/MR/VR) [6,7], integration systems [8], simulation software [9], additive manufacturing [10],
Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) [11], Big Data [12], industrial autonomous machines like
robots [13], Automated Guided Vehicles (AGVs) [14] and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) [15].
In addition, other recent technologies like blockchain [16] have been considered for creating
autonomous decentralized industrial systems. Such enabling technologies allow for creating highly
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connected factories that often rely on cloud-centered architectures and, increasingly, on novel
decentralized fog and edge computing architectures [17,18].
The dashed lines that connected the different Industry 4.0 technologies in Figure 1 indicate the
other technologies they rely on. For instance, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) rely on IIoT devices and
Big Data analysis in order to provide true Industry 4.0 applications. Such dashed lines in Figure 1
show that the different Industry 4.0 technologies have two main dependencies: cybersecurity and
IIoT. The former is related to the need for providing robust and reliable factories, while the second one
demonstrates the increasing dependence on IIoT devices like Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs),
industrial machinery, tools or communications gateways, which can be connected to internal LANs or
to the Internet so as to monitor and to interact with them. Thus, IIoT devices are essential for industrial



















Figure 1. Main Industry 4.0 technologies and their dependencies.
The problem is that many IIoT devices are in practice insecure due to weak security implementations
or to the lack of a proper security configuration. Part of such an insecurity is related to certain hardware
design requirements (e.g., many IIoT devices rely on batteries or are constrained in terms of memory
or computational power), which prevent them from implementing complex security mechanisms
(e.g., Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) [23] or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [24]) that demand a
relevant amount of resources [25]. In addition, IIoT firmware can have software bugs that in many
cases are not easy to fix (e.g., they may involve replacing the hardware or require performing specific
firmware update procedures).
The previously mentioned security problems are essentially related to neglecting cybersecurity
from the IIoT device design stage. In fact, security is often neglected by many IT university degrees,
so, in general, graduates do not receive an intensive training on the diverse fields where security
is key. This is the case of the industrial field, which, despite being critical, is barely studied from a
cybersecurity point of view.
In addition, there is a growing interest in blended or hybrid teaching models. Such models
include a mix of traditional face-to-face instruction and ordinary classroom learning with online and
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remote learning and projects to engage students in the learning process. Specifically, flipped classroom
is a pedagogical blended learning approach focused on student engagement and active learning.
The mentioned interest in blended teaching grew significantly during the first semester of 2020 due to
the COVID-19 pandemic, since blended models bring universities the opportunity to compensate part
of the educational needs during a lockdown and allow for adapting to limited classroom space while
keeping convenient instructional and social interactions (e.g., practical lab assignments).
To tackle the previously mentioned issues, this article includes the following novel contributions:
• A practical use case-based blended teaching methodology for Industry 4.0 and IIoT cybersecurity is
proposed. Such a methodology is supported by the use of an online tool like Shodan [26], which is
able to accelerate significantly the IIoT device reconnaissance stage and challenges students with
real use cases.
• A theoretical and empirical approach to Industry 4.0/IIoT security is provided to help educators to
replicate the learning outcomes expected from the course, which have been successfully put in practice
in seminars and master courses at University of A Coruña (Spain). For such a purpose, this article
provides multiple practical use cases together with useful guidelines to detect and prevent
Shodan-based attacks and to help students to understand the impact and security implications
involved in the deployment of the latest Industry 4.0 technologies.
• The course teaching results obtained during its four editions are presented and analyzed in order
to validate the proposed flipped classroom based approach.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes the latest literature on
cybersecurity teaching and IIoT/Industry 4.0 security learning. Section 3 describes the proposed
industrial cybersecurity course structure. Section 4 details the basics of Shodan and indicates how to
automate Shodan searches through its Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). In addition, such a
Section details the practical lab teaching methodology. Section 5 summarizes the obtained teaching
results, while Section 6 is devoted to the conclusions. Finally, Appendix A enumerates multiple
practical use cases of Shodan searches that allow for finding IIoT/Industry 4.0 devices.
2. State of the Art
2.1. IIoT and Industry 4.0 Cybersecurity Teaching
Although industry has been increasingly targeted by cybersecurity attacks, its security is not
widely studied in IT university programs. In fact, few university programs have incorporated
explicitly cybersecurity topics [27], despite considering such a field as a core competency of future
IT engineers [28] and recognizing the existence of an increasing gap in qualified cybersecurity
professionals [29].
Moreover, in the first semester of 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic caused a massive impact in the
higher education system, forcing institutions to put in practice emergency online and blended models,
and to implement measures to reinforce and guarantee social distancing (e.g., strategies to compensate
for limited classroom space). Unfortunately, as of writing, the vast majority of cybersecurity courses
follow the traditional lecture-and-lab structure, but some educators have proposed to make use of the
latest technologies to ease remote learning and provide more realistic experiences.
Thus, several authors described cloud-based systems that allow for implementing online
cybersecurity courses. For example, Salah et al. [30] propose the use of a virtual classroom system
based on Amazon Web Services for teaching cybersecurity, while other authors propose the use of
an off-campus network laboratory with low-cost platforms as lightweight honeypots [31]. Similarly,
Tunc et al. [32] suggest easing cybersecurity experiments by providing online tools through a concept
that the authors call Cybersecurity Lab as a Service (CLaaS).
In the specific case of IIoT cybersecurity teaching, just a few works can be found in the literature. One
of them is proposed by Dawson et al. [33], who present a framework for creating a virtual cybersecurity
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lab able to incorporate IIoT and embedded systems. Another interesting work was carried out by
Wiesen et al. [34], who focused on describing a course on hardware reverse engineering that analyzes
the practical security of devices like Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), which have been used
by Industrial Control Systems (ICSs). In the case of Thiriet et al. [35], they described a program of a
course on cybersecurity oriented towards cyber-physical systems.
To engage students on industrial cybersecurity, some researchers proposed to gamify learning
through case-based approaches [36], which can be performed together with penetration testing
competitions [37], capture-the-flag games [38,39], challenge-based platforms [40], defenders versus
attackers competitions [41] or secure development contests [42]. For example, in [43] the authors added
an educational game to teach students ICS cybersecurity to their flipped learning methodology [44]).
Another good example is detailed in [45], where gamification is analyzed when teaching industrial
cybersecurity through Kaspersky Industrial Protection Simulation (KIPS) [46].
In addition to the courses described in recent academic literature, there is hands-on professional
training provided by private education organizations that offer different certifications [47]. For example,
SANS offers a specialized course on ICS active defense and incident response that leverages tools like
Shodan [48].
Online courses (e.g., Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs)) like the Master Certificate In
Cyber Security [49] and novel digital tools are also easily accessible and scalable teaching approaches.
Such courses and tools provide a fast and cost-efficient way to deliver location-independent content
and even to replace on-site lectures of instructors [29]. However, they do not adjust adequately to the
learning capabilities or disciplines of the students (e.g., IT, criminology, legal studies), they do not
support team building, communication and interpersonal skills, and they do not reinforce the value
of tutoring.
Although there is an increasing number of BSc, MSc, postgraduate and PhD degree
programs [50–52], MOOCs, professional and life-long training and digital content [53] in the topics of
Industry 4.0 and IIoT cybersecurity, most current programs only provide publicly available generic
information (e.g., prerequisites, co-requisites, learning outcomes, syllabus, evaluation criteria, faculty).
In addition, there is a lack of literature on teaching/learning effectiveness meta-studies, with only a
limited number of papers that focus on specific cybersecurity learning outcome measurements [54].
Since learning outcome evaluation is complex and multidimensional and it involves assessing
improvements in performance and an adequate level of engagement and satisfaction, evidence of
the different learning outcomes of different courses are hard to measure and compare. Ideally,
an evaluation framework for Industry 4.0/IIoT cybersecurity teaching should have a broad scope,
be comparative, standardized, specific, flexible, use a multi-level (e.g., individual, team) and mixed
approach with qualitative and quantitative measures. Table 1 indicates some key metrics that have
been considered during the course for the evaluation at the beginning, during and at the end of the
course. Such metrics will ease further comparison with other cybersecurity courses.
Table 1. Main characteristics of the outcome measurement proposed.
What? (Qualitative) What? (Quantitative) How?
Observed Behavioral performance, conflicts Participation, teamwork, soft skills Labs, tutorials, questionnaires
Self-Reported Context, motivation, engagement Learning satisfaction Feedback survey
Tested Technical skills, knowledge Performance Final project, final exam, lab reports
Considering the previously mentioned aspects and works, this article suggests using a blended
teaching methodology that proposes:
• To base the practical part on an online tool like Shodan, whose basic functionality can be used
by any student with only an Internet connection and a web browser. In addition, no actual class
attendance is necessary to access specialized hardware, so in situations like the recent COVID-19
pandemic, students can carry on working remotely.
Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, 5607 5 of 29
• To challenge the students and to foster their curiosity by providing real use cases that they have
to analyze.
• To present numerous real examples for industrial scenarios in order to raise the student awareness
on the severe security problems that anyone with a minimum knowledge can find fast by using
tools like Shodan.
2.2. IIoT and Industry 4.0 Cybersecurity Tools
A typical cybersecurity audit/attack is composed by four phases:
• Recon. In this first phase information on the target is collected. Such data can be obtained from diverse
information sources (e.g., web sites, manufacturers, user manuals, datasheets) and usually involves
scanning the target ports to look for potential open services, misconfigurations and vulnerabilities.
• Audit/Attack planning. After analyzing the potential entry points of the target, the auditor/attacker
needs to create an audit/attack plan. For such a purpose it is necessary to choose the right steps and
tools. Regarding the latter, it is often necessary to develop software tools adapted to the audit/attack
scenario so as to exploit the vulnerabilities detected in the previous phase.
• Access. The designed plan is executed by making use of the selected tools in order to access the
target system by exploiting the detected vulnerabilities.
• Execution. After gaining access, the designed audit/attack plan will continue to take control of
the system. In this phase it is usual to perform different actions to maintain the gained access for
future intrusions (e.g., by creating a back door).
Among the four previously described phases, the Recon phase is arguably the most tedious, since it
involves dedicating a significant amount of time and resources. Luckily, there are tools that allow for
shortening such a phase drastically. Some of the most relevant are compared in Table 2 in terms of
their execution requirements, their scanning exposure (i.e., their ability for hiding the auditor/attacker
IP/port when scanning a target), their ease of use, their pricing model and the APIs they provide. As it
can be observed in Table 2, there are tools that require, besides an Internet connection, only a web
browser, which is ideal for setting up cybersecurity labs fast and thus decreasing potential installation
problems. Moreover, to prevent potential legal and network problems, students should not carry
out indiscriminate scans on industrial devices over the Internet, so the port/vulnerability scanners
provided by ZMap [55], Metasploit [56], Nmap [57] or Nessus [58] should be avoided. Among the rest
of the compared tools, for the learning approach proposed in this article, Shodan was selected due to
its low execution requirements (it only requires an Internet connection and a web browser, so students
can use it remotely and even with a smartphone or a tablet), its ease of use (its basic interactions are
similar to the ones required when using a web search engine), its available APIs (two developer APIs
and an Exploit API are available) and its pricing policy for students and academia, which allows for
using most Shodan features for free. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the methodology and
use cases proposed in this article can be easily adapted to be used with other tools like Censys [59],
ZoomEye [60], BinaryEdge [61] or Onyphe [62].
Shodan has been previously used to teach general IoT cybersecurity through practical use cases,
but following a different teaching methodology and without considering the security implications
of industrial scenarios [63]. Moreover, Shodan has also been used to assess the cybersecurity of
devices that are part of the IT systems of an industrial company. For example, vulnerable webcams,
routing devices and firewalls were analyzed by Albataineh et al. [64] after detecting them with Shodan.
Web cameras were also studied by Bugeja et al. [65], who found that a significant number of them were
weakly protected or not protected at all, which may allow attackers to use them for cyberattacks [66].
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there is a specific area on Shodan’s webpage for detecting
multiple ICSs [67]. In fact, different researchers have previously warned on the existence of numerous
ICSs, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and PLCs exposed on the Internet
and that can be easily discovered with Shodan [68–72]. In addition, Shodan has been used for detecting
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CPSs [73] or smart healthcare devices [74], thus demonstrating that little effort is required to detect
critical IIoT devices and exposed Industry 4.0 services.
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Censys Recon Web browser No High Yes No
Subscriptions for a large
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per month. Free for a small
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Yes Medium Yes No Free (open-source).
Nessus Recon Linux, MacOS,Windows Yes Medium Yes
No (but the Dev.
API indicates
vulnerabilities)
Free trial and commercial
version (more than $2000 per
year) are available.
3. Blended Teaching Methodology
This article suggests structuring the content of the proposed IIoT cybersecurity course in three
theoretical parts:
• Basic industrial cybersecurity concepts and cyberattacks. This first part deals with the main concepts
on critical infrastructures, essential services, industrial security policies and cyberattack impact.
This part can be illustrated with practical examples of industrial cyberattacks, like the ones
performed by Agent.btz, Stuxnet or Night Dragon [75].
• Introduction to ICSs. In this second part the essential concepts on ICSs, PLCs, SCADAs, CPSs and
Distributed Control Systems (DCSs) are imparted.
• IIoT and Industry 4.0 cybersecurity. The last part of the course introduces the IIoT paradigm,
the different Industry 4.0 technologies and analyzes the most relevant attacks on them.
Although the previously mentioned theoretical content is really specific, students with a minimum
knowledge on computers and computer networks usually do not have problems to understand it.
However, the proposed methodology obtains its better results with students that come from IT fields,
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like computer scientists and electrical engineers, who often have previously learned the essential
concepts on computer network architectures and computer security.
The theoretical content is taught following the flipped classroom principles [44], so students
receive theoretical content and additional material before the class (e.g., presentations on industrial
cybersecurity from the most relevant security conferences, like DEF CON [76], BlackHat [77],
or CCC [78]), which are discussed during the face-to-face time.
In addition to the theoretical part, six labs are imparted. In such labs the students first learn
how to use Shodan (Lab 1) and then put in practice the learned theoretical concepts on industrial
cybersecurity. Thus, the course content is structured according to the following syllabus:
• Week 1: Industrial cybersecurity basics.
– Learning goals:
∗ To learn the essential concepts behind industrial network security.
– Developed competences:
∗ To gain knowledge about legal and technical standards used in industrial cybersecurity,
their implications in systems design, in the use of security tools and in the protection of
information in industrial scenarios.
∗ To gain knowledge about the role of cybersecurity in the design of new industrial
processes, as well as of the singularities and restrictions to be addressed in order to
build a secure industrial infrastructure.
∗ Ability to identify and diagnose the associated risks of cyberattacks on industry and
critical infrastructures.
– Addressed topics:
∗ Introduction to industrial cybersecurity.
∗ Industrial cybersecurity policies.
∗ Impact of cyberattacks on industry and critical infrastructures.
∗ Practical industrial cyberattack use cases.
∗ Lab 1: Shodan basics.
• Weeks 2 and 3: ICS cybersecurity.
– Learning goals:
∗ To learn the essential concepts on the different types of ICSs and their security.
– Developed competences:
∗ To gain knowledge about how the most popular ICS hardware and protocols work and
their role in industrial processes.
∗ To gain knowledge about ICS cybersecurity, including the most relevant attacks and
potential defense strategies.
– Addressed topics:
∗ Types of ICSs.
∗ Traditional industrial communications architectures.
∗ Advanced communications architectures.
∗ CPSs.
∗ Labs 2 and 3: Practical use cases.
• Week 4: IIoT and Industry 4.0 cybersecurity.
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– Learning goals:
∗ To learn the essential concepts on the security of IIoT and the latest Industry
4.0 technologies.
∗ To understand the security implications of making use of Industry 4.0 technologies.
– Developed competences:
∗ To gain knowledge about IIoT hardware, software and infrastructure, as well as about
their role in industrial scenarios.
∗ To gain knowledge about Industry 4.0 technologies and their cybersecurity.
– Addressed topics:
∗ Introduction to Industry 4.0.
∗ Introduction to IoT and IIoT systems.
∗ Main IIoT cyberattacks.
∗ Main Industry 4.0 cyberattacks.
∗ Lab 4: Advanced Shodan scripting.
• Weeks 5 and 6: Practical Industry 4.0 cyberattacks.
– Learning goals:
∗ To understand the main network security issues, and the different protection techniques
and attacks for Industry 4.0 systems, as well as to know how to implement them.
– Developed competences:
∗ To gain knowledge of cyberattack and cyberdefense techniques on Industry 4.0 systems.
∗ To gain the ability to apply theoretical knowledge to practical situations within the scope
of industrial infrastructures, equipment or specific application domains, including precise
operating requirements.
∗ Ability to innovate and contribute to the advance of industrial cybersecurity by designing
new algorithms or techniques for industrial devices in order to eventually help in the
protection public, private or commercial of industrial assets.
– Addressed topics:
∗ Cyberattacks to industrial robotics, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Automatic Guided
Vehicles (AGVs) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs).
∗ Augmented/Mixed/Virtual Reality cybersecurity.
∗ Cloud/edge/mist computing cybersecurity.
∗ Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) cyberattacks.
∗ Auto-identification system cybersecurity.
∗ Vertical and horizontal integration system cybersecurity.
∗ Additive manufacturing cyberattacks.
∗ Labs 5 and 6: Final project.
As it can be observed in the previous syllabus, the content is imparted during an intensive
six-week course, which corresponds to a 3 ECTS (European Credit Transfer System) credit workload
that belongs to the Master Program on Cybersecurity delivered jointly by the universities of A Coruña
and Vigo [79]. The course is attended by university students with diverse backgrounds, but mostly by
computer scientists and electrical engineers.
Each week of the course, three hours are dedicated to lectures and practical labs. Moreover,
the students had to do a final project on IIoT/Industry 4.0 security whose main topic was selected
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by them (for instance, some students of the 2020 class analyzed adversarial attacks [80] for industrial
robotics or smart grid meter security). Thus, during the course the students deliver two lab reports
and a final project memory together with all the involved software. Overall, the course was designed
for requiring 20 hours of in-person activities and 54 hours of autonomous work.
The following are the main learning outcomes expected from the course:
• To learn the essential concepts on industrial cybersecurity.
• To understand the different defense and attack techniques that affect industrial systems and to
know how to implement them.
• To understand the most common security problems and attacks that affect industrial networks,
as well as to know the essential techniques to minimize them.
• To be able to understand the impact and security implications involved in the deployment of the
latest Industry 4.0 technologies.
The learning outcomes related to learning concepts are evaluated through a theoretical final exam
(40% of the grade), while the rest of the outcomes are assessed through the lab reports (30%) and the
final project (30%).
4. Shodan for Practical IIoT/Industry 4.0 Cybersecurity Labs
4.1. Lab 1: Shodan Basics
Shodan is an Internet scanner that searches for text banners, which are shown by a device when a
remote user connects to them (for instance, the welcome message of an FTP server) [81]. Such banners
usually contain information that allow for identifying certain characteristics of an Internet service
(e.g., the software version of an FTP server) or of the computer where it runs (e.g., the version of the
operating system). The collected information can be used later for detecting vulnerabilities and for
defining potential cyberattacks.
Shodan can be used like other web search engines, but the results it produces are conditioned by
the type of user that performs the query. For instance, non-registered users have a limited number
of queries and cannot use certain Shodan features. One of such features are filters, which allow
for narrowing down search results geographically (e.g., by country, city), by IP (e.g., specific IP or
network), by port or organization [82].
An example of Shodan search with filters is illustrated in Figure 2, which also indicates the
different parts of a Shodan main result page. As it can be observed in Figure 2, the result page lists
more than 22,000 devices in which port 102 is open. Such a Shodan query is really relevant for the
industrial field, since it allows for discovering Siemens S7 PLCs (port 102 is used by the S7 protocol to
communicate PLCs of the Siemens S7 family).
It is important to indicate the students that not all the discovered devices are ‘real’ S7 PLCs:
there is a significant amount of honeypots that are deployed with the goal of determining when
cyberattacks are performed, thus gathering information on the strategies of the attackers. This is a
common problem in previous Shodan literature: statistics on detected devices are given based on
a specific query, but honeypots are not filtered out. For instance, the previous Siemens S7 query
can be refined to determine which of the previous detected devices were actually making use of the
ICS/SCADA honeypot Conpot [83]. It is also worth mentioning that Shodan provides a tool that helps
to identify to a certain extent (i.e., with an estimated probability called ‘Honeyscore’) whether an IP
address is a honeypot [84].
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Figure 2. Shodan result list of potential Siemens S7 PLCs.
4.2. Labs 2 and 3: Practical Use Cases
After the students complete the lab on the basics of Shodan, they carry out the second lab of the
course. Depending on the previous knowledge and skills of the students, such a second lab can follow
two different approaches:
• Guided approach:
1. First, the course instructor gives each student a list of Shodan queries like the ones detailed
in Appendix A.
2. The students then try the queries on Shodan and analyze the obtained results in order to
determine which IIoT or Industry 4.0 devices are detected by the queries. Although in many
cases the information gathered by Shodan is enough to identify the devices, the students
usually need to make use of additional web search engines to find information from the
manufacturers or distributors.
3. Once the students gather enough information to identify the IIoT/Industry 4.0 devices
and understand their essential inner working, they analyze the vulnerabilities and exploits
detected by Shodan. Moreover, the students look for additional signs of weak security, like the
use of default credentials or outdated security mechanisms.
• Autonomous approach:
1. In this approach the course instructor initially gives the students a specific target or a set of
targets (i.e., IIoT/Industry 4.0 devices).
2. The students first investigate the targets by gathering information from their datasheets
or manuals with the objective of understanding how they work and which are their
default credentials.
3. Then the students build Shodan queries that allow for discovering the targeted devices.
4. Finally, the vulnerability assessment is performed with the help of the Shodan exploit API
and other data sources like the available Common Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE) reports.
As an example, Table 3 provides a summary of some of the results obtained by the students for
different use cases analyzed during the 2020 course. The main conclusions for such use cases are:
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1 2 - - - -
#Detected
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• C4MAX IIoT monitoring devices:
– Shodan query: “[1m[35mWelcome on console”.
– All the devices were completely open through their Telnet service.
• NetBotz monitor:
– Shodan query: “Netbotz appliance”.
– Roughly 40% of the detected devices have no security at all and allow for accessing the
environmental data and onboard web cameras. The rest of the devices required authentication.
• Somfy alarm system:
– Shodan query: title:“Centrale” “Pragma: no-cache, no-store”.
– Most alarm systems are properly configured, a couple of them made use of the default
administration credentials, so any user with access was able to switch off or on the alarms.
• Proliphix thermostats:
– Shodan query: title:“Status &amp; Control”.
– All the analyzed devices control panels were open and provided the ambient temperature
without requiring credentials.
• Automatic tank gauges:
– Shodan query: unleaded.
– All the analyzed devices provided the tank gauge data without carrying out an authentication
procedure. In fact, such data could be obtained through Shodan (i.e., no direct connection
with the devices was required to gather the IIoT data).
• Electro Industries Gaugetech smart grid meter:
– Shodan query: “Server: EIG Embedded Web Server” “200 Document follows”.
– Most devices provided barely any security in spite of monitoring a critical infrastructure like
the electrical grid. Thus, 80% of the analyzed smart meters could be accessed as administrator.
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4.3. Lab 4: Advanced Shodan scripting
Although Shodan provides a really clean and intuitive web interface for finding IIoT/Industry
4.0 devices fast, in practice, vulnerability assessment automation requires making use of Shodan
APIs. There are Shodan APIs for multiple languages (e.g., Python, Java, Ruby) and are offered either
as Representational State Transfer (REST) APIs or streaming APIs. The former enables exchanging
information with Shodan through GET, POST, DELETE and PUT requests, while the latter uses
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) files for the data exchanges. In addition, Shodan provides an exploit
REST API that collects vulnerabilities from diverse data sources.
As an example, Listing 1 shows a Python script that automates the detection of potential Siemens
S7 PLCs and their exploits. The script, which is also provided as supplementary material, first prints
the IP and city of the devices and then gets the detected vulnerabilities and exploits through Shodan
exploit REST API. It is important to note that, to make use of the script, the developer needs to indicate
a valid Shodan API key. Moreover, the sleep(1) calls should not be removed, since a one-second delay
is necessary to respect the Shodan query limit.
Listing 1: Python script for automating Siemens S7 PLC exploit detection.
1 import shodan
2 from time import~sleep
3
4 SHODAN_API_KEY = ‘‘[PUT KEY HERE]’’
5 api = shodan.Shodan(SHODAN_API_KEY)




10 PLCs = api.search(query)
11 print(’Total number of Siemens S7 PLCs: {}’.format(PLCs[’total’]))
12
13 for result in PLCs[’matches ’]:
14
15 print(’IP: {}’.format(result[’ip_str ’]))
16 host = api.host(result[’ip_str ’])




21 if str(host.get(’vulns ’)) != ’None’:
22 print(’-------------- Detected Exploits --------------------’)
23 for vulnerability in host.get(’vulns’):
24 exploits = api.exploits.search(vulnerability)
25 sleep (1)
26 print(’Found {0} exploits for vulnerability ‘‘{1}’’ \n’.format(
27 exploits.get(’total’), vulnerability))
28
29 except shodan.APIError as erro:
30 print(
31 ’Error found for exploit query: ‘‘{0}’’’.format(query))
32 print(’Shodan error: {0}’.format(erro))
33
34 except shodan.APIError as e:
35 print(’Error: {}’.format(e))
5. Teaching Results
The methodology and contents described in this article have been used by the authors during the
last years for teaching an IIoT and Industry 4.0 course to 119 students. Due to the background of the
students (they had no previous experience on industrial cybersecurity), of the two possible versions of
the methodology described in Section 4.2, the guided approach was selected. Thus, every student first
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had to investigate three different Shodan queries assigned by the instructor and then automate the
search through Python scripts like the one previously detailed in Section 4.3.
It is important to note that all the students that attended the four courses were explicitly asked
to not to exploit the detected vulnerabilities or to carry out brute-force attacks on the devices
(i.e., the students’ goal was to audit the devices to learn how to apply cybersecurity by design),
which would probably raise the number of detected compromised devices significantly. Since it is difficult
to control the behavior of all the students (who may be tempted to exploit certain vulnerabilities),
to prevent potential legal problems and dangerous situations, an instructor should select the course
practical use cases carefully, thus avoiding critical infrastructure and other industrial systems in which
the modification may derive serious consequences.
In addition, universities should check the legal requirements of putting in practice a course like
the one proposed, since law differs significantly from one country to another. For instance, in the
country where the proposed course was imparted (Spain), a mere vulnerability scan over a critical
infrastructure usually derives into a complaint from the entity that manages the infrastructure. Such a
complaint is generally settled in a friendly way, since no damage is caused. However, if damage exists,
the action may be classified as a cyberattack and thus derive into a formal police report. Therefore,
it is extremely important to warn the students on what they are going to find and on the impact
that their actions may have from the physical damage and legal consequences point of view. As a
consequence, before giving the students any industrial target to be analyzed, it is essential to establish a
warning mechanism that involves the instructor: the students should never interact with the discovered
industrial devices and, if they find a relevant exposed industrial system, they should warn the course
instructor, who will take the necessary measures.
5.1. Obtained Results
This section summarizes the results obtained by the 119 students that took the last four editions
of the proposed course. A total of 119 students took part in the course (105 men and 14 women),
which were mostly computer scientists, electrical engineers and electronic engineers. The vast majority
were advanced programmers, but they had neither previous knowledge of Shodan or practical
experience on IIoT or in most Industry 4.0 technologies.
The following are the general results obtained during the four imparted courses:
• A total of 99 students eventually took the whole course (20 students dropped out during the
course), delivering 198 reports for the two practical labs.
• A total of 178 different queries were given to the students, of which 118 were eventually analyzed
(60 of them were assigned to the 20 drop-outs, but they are not considered in the presented results)
and actually targeted 47 different IIoT and Industry 4.0 devices (some of the queries targeted the
same devices).
• For each of the 118 Shodan queries, only the first 20 Shodan results were analyzed. This means
that a total of roughly 2360 devices were studied.
• For the 47 studied IIoT/Industry 4.0 devices, a total of 3749 vulnerabilities related to already
published CVEs were found by the students. Such a high number was mainly due to a
few IIoT/Industry 4.0 devices that executed outdated software (e.g., outdated PHP versions,
old HTTP servers).
• Of the 2360 studied devices, 205 implemented no authentication mechanisms, while 103 of them
made use of the default administration credentials. These results imply that cyberattackers may
easily take control over 13% of the analyzed industrial devices. It is relevant to point out that,
if the results obtained by the 2020 class were only considered, the mentioned percentage would be
roughly 25%, since 220 out of the 900 industrial devices analyzed by the students did not make
use of proper security mechanisms.
As a conclusion of the imparted courses, it can be stated that, despite the students’ lack of
previous knowledge on industrial cybersecurity, it was possible to train them fast to detect potential
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vulnerabilities on IIoT and Industry 4.0 devices connected to Internet. In addition, the students
concluded that Shodan is a simple but really powerful tool for cybersecurity researchers that
emphasizes the need for taking care of the security of the exposed devices, especially for industries
that are considered critical.
With respect to the problems that the students found during the courses, they were mainly related
to two aspects:
• Shodan API programming. Some of the students had problems during the development of the
Python script. Specifically, the following were their most frequent problems:
– Excessive number of requests. For most account types, Shodan restricts the number of
requests to one per second, so it is necessary to include a software delay in the script (in other
case Shodan will return an error).
– Use of filters in scripts. Some students had problems when making use of certain filters
through Shodan’s programming API because the account type they were using did not allow
such a use. There are two potential solutions to this problem: to upgrade the account type
or to perform the search in two sequential steps: the first step would gather the data on a
specific query, while a second one would parse the collected data according to a certain filter.
Obviously, this latter method is clearly slower than the former, since it requires to parse the
collected results locally with the developed script.
– Lack of documentation. Shodan’s REST API documentation is clear, but the documentation
on some of the wrappers that allow for using it with certain programming languages is not so
complete. In the case of the official Python wrapper [85], although it has improved over the
last years and provides good examples on basic searches, some content is still missing, like the
meaning of certain fields that enable accessing relevant data. For instance, students had
problems for determining which information was available on the detected hosts and how to
access it (e.g., it is not straightforward to determine that the vulnerability information on a
host is accessed through the ‘vuln’ field).
• Lack of knowledge on the analyzed industrial equipment. The students had to look for manufacturer
manuals and datasheets in order to understand how the studied devices operated and then
determined the impact of potential vulnerabilities.
5.2. Overall Marks and Learning Outcomes
As it was previously indicated in Section 3, the students are evaluated through a theoretical exam,
lab reports and a final project. The final grade is given within the range 0 to 10, which is the most
commonly used in the Spanish university system.
Table 4 shows the average, median and variance of the grades of all the students that took part in
the four editions of the course. The overall average course grade was 8.1813. As it can be observed in
Table 4, the grades are in general high, but lower for the final exam. These results reflect an aspect that
was also observed by the course instructors: students are more motivated by the practical part of the
course than for the theoretical concepts behind it.
In addition, it is interesting to analyze the correlation between the different grades. The covariance
analysis indicates that there is a positive correlation between the grades of the lab reports and the one
obtained for the final project (0.401) and between the final project and the exam (0.226), but there is
no correlation between the grades of the lab reports and the final exam grade (−0.067). Therefore,
the results indicate that the students that delivered good lab reports also delivered a good final project
and those performed well in the final exam. However, although the course practical and theoretical
parts are related, they evaluate different industrial cybersecurity aspects, so good practical skills do
not guarantee to obtain a high grade on the final exam. In any case, at the view of the results, it can be
concluded that the main learning outcomes are accomplished:
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• The students demonstrate at the end of the course that they know the essential concepts on
industrial cybersecurity.
• The students are able to apply successfully the course methodology to evaluate through Shodan
the security of real industrial systems.
• The students also demonstrate through the lab reports and final projects that they understand the
theory behind it and thus they are able to address the most common cybersecurity problems and
attacks that affect IIoT/Industry 4.0 systems.
• The students end up being aware of the dangers of exposing insecure industrial devices on the
Internet and of the impact derived from the use of non-properly protected devices of diverse
Industry 4.0 technologies.
• Due to time and workload constraints, part of the work carried out by the students in their
supervised projects was restricted to specific regions (e.g., countries, cities, industrial regions) or
industries so as to limit the diversity of analyzed devices and thus get in-depth knowledge on
them. Such analyses can provide high-value advice to different industrial companies and sectors.
In addition, a cross-comparison of the practicality for different industries and countries can also
provide some interesting insights, especially from a business standpoint.
It would have been very interesting to perform an additional control questionnaire about the
learning outcomes a few months after finishing the course but, unfortunately, it could not be carried
out due to legal restrictions. Specifically, once a course is finished, according to the Spanish law of
Protection of Personal Data (Ley Orgánica de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal, LOPD) and the
Regulation EU 2016/679 [86] followed by the University of A Coruña [87], student contact information
should be removed.
Table 4. Average, median and variance of the grades obtained by all the students that took the course.
Lab Reports Final Project Final Exam
Average 8.651 8.884 7.302
Median 8.625 9.000 7.437
Variance 0.802 1.414 2.705
5.3. Student Feedback
Regarding the feedback from the students, it was collected by the university quality measurement
system, which assigns a grade between 1 and 7 to different aspects of the course: ‘1’ means that the
students completely disagree with the statement, while a ‘7’ means that they completely agree. It is
important to note that the university quality measurement system was not available for the first edition
of the course. For the rest of the course editions, only 22% of the 119 students answered the feedback
survey. Such a survey was collected directly through the university quality measurement system
(“Avaliación docente”), which acts as an independent evaluator of each of the courses imparted at the
University of A Coruña. In addition, as a second step, the responses and the instructor are evaluated
by third-party agencies that ensure education quality, like the Spanish University System Quality
Observatory of the National Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation (ANECA) and the
Agency for Quality Assurance of the Galician University System (ACSUG). It must be noted that the
achieved percentage of response, although it may seem low, it is actually significantly higher than the
average student response percentage for the Master program where the course is imparted, which in
the last years has only received responses from 13.04% of the students [88]. This is essentially due to
the fact that filling the questionnaires is a voluntary activity.
Specifically, the following questions were asked:
1. The course was properly structured.
2. The amount of work was proportional to the assigned hours.
3. The course required guidance from the instructor.
4. It was necessary to ask the instructor doubts on the course lectures or labs.
Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, 5607 16 of 29
5. The evaluation methodology was appropriate considering the imparted content.
6. With the content imparted in this course I reached my own learning objectives.
7. I am globally satisfied with the course.
The obtained results are shown in Table 5 and the distribution of the answers for each value of
the Likert scale is shown in Table 6. Additionally, a bar chart of the results can be seen in Figure 3.
At the view of the feedback results, it can be concluded that the students perceived the course as
well structured and organized (questions 1 and 2), appropriate for carrying out part of the work
autonomously (questions 3 and 4), properly evaluated (question 5) and satisfactory in general and in
terms of their learning goals (questions 6 and 7).
Table 5. Results obtained through the course feedback survey.
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7
Average 6.46 5.85 4.54 5.38 6.92 6.58 6.46
Mode 7 7 4 7 7 7 7
Median 7 6 4 6 7 7 7
Table 6. Number of answers obtained for each value of the Likert scale.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 1 0 0 0 0 2 10 14
Question 2 0 0 2 0 8 6 10
Question 3 0 2 4 8 4 6 2
Question 4 0 0 6 2 4 4 10
Question 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 24
Question 6 0 0 0 2 0 5 19
Question 7 0 0 0 0 4 6 16
Figure 3. Bar chart of the feedback survey results.
6. Conclusions
The interest in IIoT and Industry 4.0 cybersecurity has increased in the last years, but, unfortunately,
such fields are not currently widely taught at a university level. To tackle such an issue, this article
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proposed a practical use case-based methodology that enables performing industrial cybersecurity
audits fast on devices exposed on the Internet. The described blended teaching methodology is aimed
at IT university students but requires no previous experience on industrial cybersecurity tools thanks
to tools like Shodan, which provide a search engine able to find IIoT/Industry 4.0 devices in an
intuitive and easy way. Thus, this article detailed multiple online searches that allow for discovering
thousands of devices related to the different Industry 4.0 technologies. The results obtained during
the four editions of the course show the usefulness of the proposed methodology: the students were
able to find that 13% of the analyzed IIoT/Industry 4.0 systems could be easily accessed and that
such industrial systems had 3749 CVE-related vulnerabilities. Moreover, the feedback received from
the students on the course was really positive. In addition, the blended methodology was flexible,
even during the COVID-19 lockdown, and the obtained teaching results indicate that the established
course learning outcomes were accomplished and, as a consequence, the targeted competences can
be considered to have been acquired. Therefore, this article provides useful guidelines for teaching
industrial cybersecurity through practical use cases, which will allow for training the next generation
of security researchers and developers of the Industry 4.0 era.
Supplementary Materials: The following code is available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/16/
5607/s1, Listing 1: Python script for automating Siemens S7 PLC exploit detection.
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Appendix A. Practical IIoT and Industry 4.0 Use Cases for Labs 2 and 3
This Appendix provides numerous examples of practical use cases for Labs 2 and 3 that allow for
discovering specific industrial devices that in many cases monitor and control critical infrastructure.
It is important to note that, to provide easy-to-test examples, the following subsections indicate
specific Shodan queries, which can be easily adapted to be used with the online search engines cited
in Section 2.2.
Appendix A.1. IIoT Devices
Shodan is able to find a significant amount of IIoT devices that can become potential targets
for cyberattacks or may be used to perform cyberattacks. One of the types of devices that have
been traditionally targeted by Shodan researchers are webcams and Digital Video Recorder (DVR)
systems, which are used by many companies in their surveillance systems. Unfortunately, as of writing,
many webcam and DVR systems remain unprotected or weakly protected, being really easy to find
video-surveillance systems that make use of their default credentials or that do not implement any
security mechanism. For instance, such weaknesses were exploited in 2016 by Mirai, a botnet that
infected hundreds of thousands of IoT devices like DVRs, webcams or routers to perform one of the
largest Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in history [89]. Specifically, Mirai was able to
create its botnet by performing brute force attacks on weakly protected IoT devices, thus obtaining
their management credentials.
A practical example of weakly protected video-surveillance systems that can be found with
Shodan are thousands of ExacqVision systems (Shodan query: “server: wfe”): a relevant amount
of such systems make use of the default administration credentials or of easy-to-guess passwords
(e.g., ‘1234’, ‘admin’). As an example, Figures A1 and A2 show two screenshots of unprotected
Exacqvision systems found with Shodan. There are many more examples of weakly protected webcams
(either deployed in industrial scenarios or private households), like the ones that result from searching
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for Linksys WVC80N cameras (Shodan query: WVC80N), AXIS webcams (Shodan query: “port:80
has_screenshot:true”) or AVTECH IP webcams (Shodan query: linux upnp avtech).
Figure A1. Example of a weakly protected Exacqvision configuration video-surveillance system.
Figure A2. Example of another weakly protected Exacqvision video-surveillance system.
Similarly to webcams, unprotected DVR systems can be easily found with Shodan. An example
of such systems are UNIMO UDR DVRs (Shodan query: html:"DVR_H264 ActiveX"): almost all of the
systems analyzed by the authors for this article made use of the default credentials (a screenshot of
one of such systems is shown in Figure A3).
Shodan is able to detect other IIoT systems that can be either used by industrial companies or
private homes, like certain home automation or climate control systems. For instance, the Somfy
system (Shodan query: title:"Centrale" Pragma:"no-cache, no-store”), allows for managing a home or
company security alarms remotely. Although the Somfy system is password protected through a web
interface, unfortunately, it is easy to find with Shodan systems that make use of the default credentials
(an example of one of such systems is shown in Figure A4). Regarding climate control system, it is
not difficult to find exposed thermostats from ICY (Shodan query: title:"ICY Clever Thermostat"),
Heatmiser (Shodan query: title:"Heatmiser Wifi Thermostat") or Proliphix (Shodan query: title:"Status
&amp; Control"). In addition, some control access systems are also exposed on the Internet and part of
them use the default administration credentials (e.g., HID VertX systems (Shodan query: "HID VertX"
port:4070)).
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Figure A3. Screenshot of vulnerable Unimo DVR system.
Figure A4. Screenshot of vulnerable Somfy alarm system.
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It is also worth mentioning that Message-Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol
is increasingly being used for resource-constrained IIoT devices (e.g., sensors, actuators), but,
unfortunately, many deployments lack a proper security configuration. Thus, it is straightforward to
discover MQTT brokers (Shodan query: "MQTT Connection Code: 0" set –alarm) that are unprotected
and that expose the internal MQTT topics.
Industrial vehicles can also be monitored in order to optimize the processes of an Industry
4.0 smart factory. For such a purpose, the GPS and connectivity solution provided by the C4MAX
device can be really useful. Unfortunately, most of the C4MAX devices detected by Shodan (query:
“[1m[35mWelcome on console”) provide a Telnet connection that requires no credentials, which allows
remote attackers to access the system and the vehicle data.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that certain voice communications mechanisms that are commonly
used by companies can be found by Shodan, like Voice-over-IP (VoIP) Public Branch Exchange
(PBX) systems (example of Shodan query: PBX “gateway console”–password port:23) or the popular
Polycom videoconference systems (Shodan query: http.title:“–Polycom" “Server: lighttpd"), in which the
management software also suffers from vulnerabilities and the lack of a proper security configuration
(e.g., the use of default administration credentials).
Appendix A.2. Robotics
Robotic systems are typically used for automating tasks in smart factories, either for operating
autonomously (e.g., for painting or soldering tasks) or for collaborating with industrial operators
during specific tasks (e.g., to hold heavy objects).
Robotic arms are commonly used in industry and they essentially consist of a controller,
different sensors and multiple servo motors that conform the arm. The robotic arm can be controlled
manually by an operator or it can act autonomously, according to certain software-defined behavior.
In this latter case the controller receives inputs from the sensors (e.g., from a video camera), process them
and then decides the actions to be carried out by the servo motors. Cybersecurity problems may arise
when the robot controller is connected to the Internet, since a remote attacker may take control of the
robot and then cause product or physical damage [90].
Shodan is able to find just a few hundreds of industrial robots connected directly to the Internet,
like the ones from ABB Robotics (Shodan query: ABB slave), FANUC (Shodan query: FANUC FTP),
Yaskawa (Shodan query: Yaskawa) or Mitsubishi (Shodan query: Mitsubishi FTP). However, it must be
noted that, in many cases, the robot controller is not connected directly to the Internet, but through a
communications router. Shodan is able to find thousands of such routers [90] from manufacturers like
Ewon (Shodan query: ewon), Westermo (Shodan query: westermo) or Sierra Wireless (Shodan query:
sierra wireless).
Appendix A.3. ICSs, SCADAs and CPSs
As it was previously mentioned, Shodan includes a specific section on its web page that provides
a good compilation of queries for finding ICSs and SCADAs [67]. For example, it is really easy to find
PLCs that make use of Modbus (Shodan query: port:502), EtherNet/IP (Shodan query: port:44818) or
DNP3 (Shodan query: port:20000 source address).
ICSs can be monitored or controlled remotely through SCADAs that may not provide an
Internet-connected interface. In such cases, many industrial companies allow for accessing the
SCADA through a Virtual Network Computing (VNC) system. Shodan enables locating VNC systems
really fast (Shodan query: has_screenshot:true product:VNC “authentication disabled"). Unfortunately,
many developers do not implement any authentication mechanism, like it is shown in Figures A5 and
A6 for two SCADAs found with Shodan.
There are also certain cases where a SCADA is initially secured properly, but, due to the lack of
software maintenance (i.e., periodic software updates), it becomes vulnerable. A good example are a
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significant number of Nordex wind farm management systems (Shodan query: Jetty 3.1.8 “200 OK")
that run on an insecure version of Jetty.
Shodan is also able to discover CPSs that are poorly configured in terms of security. For instance,
NetBotz is a solution for monitoring remotely the health of data centers. A few NetBotz instances can be
detected by Shodan (Shodan query: title:“netbotz appliance”) and, as of writing, all are open, so anyone
can see the environmental conditions of the data center and, in some cases, the video-surveillance
cameras can be accessed (an example is shown in Figure A7 on the left). In addition, certain sensor data
that are periodically collected by remote CPSs can be accessed easily through Shodan. For example,
queries like fuel oil, diesel or unleaded enable accessing information from automatic tank gauges [91]




Figure A5. Screenshot of open VNC-controlled SCADA found with Shodan.
Figure A6. Screenshot of open VNC-controlled SCADA found with Shodan.




Figure A7. Open NetBotz installation (left) and data from an automatic tank gauge (right).
Appendix A.4. Additive Manufacturing
Additive manufacturing (also commonly known as 3D printing) systems can also be detected
by Shodan, since some of them are exposed on the Internet in order to allow remote users to monitor
and control the manufacturing process. For the same reason, other computer-based tools like lathes,
milling machines or laser cutters may also be detected by Shodan. For instance, thousands of 3D
printers that make use of the open-source software OctoPrint (mostly non-industrial 3D printers)
can be found by Shodan (query: title:octoprint 200 OK). Most of them are properly secured, but a
few hundred of them still remain completely open (Shodan query: title:“OctoPrint"–title:“Login"
http.favicon.hash:1307375944). Figure A8 shows a screenshot of one of such unprotected 3D printers.
Figure A8. Example of exposed 3D printer found with Shodan.
Appendix A.5. Big Data Software
Big data software allows for processing and storing large amounts of information that is collected
from diverse sources. Once stored, such data are analyzed and then certain conclusion can be drawn
and decisions can be taken.
First, it must be noted that Shodan allows for detecting running instances of traditional SQL
databases like MySQL (Shodan query: product:MySQL) or PostgreSQL (Shodan query: product:PostgreSQL).
In addition, hundreds of thousands of NoSQL databases can be found executing popular software like
Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, 5607 23 of 29
MongoDB (Shodan query: product:MongoDB), CouchDB (Shodan query: product:CouchDB), Cassandra
(Shodan query: product:Cassandra) or Elasticsearch (Shodan query: port:9200 json). In the case of
MongoDB, it is straightforward to find open databases (Shodan query: product:MongoDB databases),
most of which have been already hacked (this can be observed since there is a database called
‘READ_ME_TO_RECOVER_YOUR_DATA’ or similar that in its content demands Bitcoins to restore the
database data). Regarding Cassandra, Shodan finds a few hundred open databases whose keyspaces
are exposed (Shodan query: product:cassandra keyspaces).
Probably, the most popular software tool for processing and managing large amounts of data is
Apache Hadoop. Shodan currently exposes data of several hundred of their servers (Shodan query:
product:namenode). Moreover, Big Data developers can manage Hadoop clusters together with another
Apache tool: Ambari. As of writing, Shodan is able to find just a few Apache Ambari servers
(Shodan query: ambari), but some of them make use of the default administration credentials (a
screenshot of the dashboard of one of such systems is shown in Figure A9 on the left).
There are also other Big Data tools that allow for visualizing easily large sets of data.
For example, Kibana is commonly deployed together with Elasticsearch to visualize the collected
information. Several thousands of open Kibana servers can be currently found with Shodan (query:
kibana content-length: 217). As an example, Figure A9 shows on the right a screenshot of an open
Kibana dashboard.
Finally, it is worth mentioning another Apache project that is increasingly being used by Big Data
developers: Apache Spark. Such a tool provides a general-purpose cluster-computing framework
for processing large amounts of data in parallel. Shodan can find several hundreds of monitoring
panels of Apache Spark masters (Shodan query: “Spark master" worker) and workers (Shodan query:
Spark worker). Figure A10 shows as examples screenshots of the panels of a Spark master and a worker
exposed by Shodan.
Figure A9. Apache Ambari (left) and Kibana (right) servers.
Figure A10. Monitoring panels of an Apache Spark master (left) and a worker (right).
Appendix A.6. Cloud Computing
Cloud computing has a relevant role in the Industry 4.0 paradigm since a significant amount
of the processing is carried out by remote servers that centralize resources in a scalable way.
Cloud servers usually run multiple virtual machines that are managed through a software like VMware
vSphere. As of writing, Shodan detects almost 3000 VMware vSphere web clients (Shodan query:
Path=/vsphere-client/). Moreover, Shodan currently detects almost 2000 running instances of VMware
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vCloud Director (Shodan query: X-VMWARE-VCLOUD-REQUEST-ID), another VMware cloud
infrastructure management software.
There are also other tools that run on the cloud that may be vulnerable to attacks. For instance,
it is possible to find numerous Rsync servers, which are used to synchronize files between computers
(Shodan query: Product:rsyncd). In addition, many software developers make use of automation
tools that provide web dashboards with the shared projects. This is for instance the case of Jenkins:
Figure A11 shows two open Jenkins dashboards discovered with Shodan (query: port:8081 “Dashboard
[Jenkins]"). Another example is GitLab servers, which are typically used for software project
development: more than 61,000 of them can be currently found through Shodan (Shodan query:
http.favicon.hash:1278323681) and many of them allow for registering additional users to have direct
access to the shared project code.
Figure A11. Examples of Jenkins dashboards found with Shodan.
Appendix A.7. Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs)
DLTs like blockchain provide decentralized transaction ledgers that are designed to avoid data
tampering, thus implementing advanced cryptography mechanisms [92]. Thus, blockchain enables
implementing decentralized applications that allow for exchanging transactions among entities that
do not trust each other or do not want to incur in the additional costs derived from the involvement
of certain middlemen (e.g., banks, distributors) [93]. Such features make blockchain appropriate for
Industry 4.0 companies that require trusting their own employees and providers [16,94,95].
Most blockchain systems (e.g., Bitcoin [96], Ethereum [97]) are composed by regular nodes
(i.e., nodes that only interact with the blockchain to read from it or to write data on it) and full nodes,
which act like regular nodes but also validate the exchanged transactions. Such a validation process
is often called mining, which involves a consensus mechanism and some sort of verification process.
Thus, miners are nodes that validate collaboratively blocks of transactions before adding them to
the blockchain.
Shodan is capable of finding blockchain miners. For instance, Antminer is one of the most
popular mining platforms [98], since it provides dedicated and really fast hardware. As of writing,
Shodan detects almost 1000 antminers (Shodan query: antminer). The transaction log of many Ethereum
miners can also be discovered easily (Shodan query: “Eth speed:"), as well as hundreds of Bitcoin
miners (Shodan query: lastblock). Furthermore, more than 3000 Ethereum clients are currently detected
by Shodan (query: “Ethereum RPC").
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